

ANNA KRÓLIKOWSKA\*  
Uniwersytet Szczeciński

## Postsecularism and Postsecularity and Their Different Forms and Meanings in Europe

**Abstract:** In many analyses Europe is pictured as cultural unity, which can be *prima facie* justified. Nonetheless, more thorough beholding brings a picture of non-negligible multifariousness. The variety of historical experiences has moulded, *inter alia*, different positions and roles of religion, and processes affecting religious aspects of social life are at different stages or under various conditions inside European societies. Against such a background appears the ambiguity of what in contemporary humanities is called “the postsecular”. Hence the greater is a need to differentiate between postsecularism and postsecularity. Whereas the former of these categories refers to a specific complex of ideological and axionormative character, the latter one pertains more to social perception of these values and ideas, and prompts to ask sociological questions about actual social attitudes. Both of the notions are important tools not only enriching the more abstract humanistic reflexion over contemporary socio-cultural phenomena, but also conducive to investigating the more and more differentiated and compound attitudes to religion, that are additionally entwined into institutional, ideal, or political settings.

**Key words:** European societies, postsecularity, postsecularism, secularity, secularism, modernisation, multiculturalism.

### Introduction

In many theoretical elaborations Europe is pictured as cultural unity. This can be *prima facie* and for some purposes justified. Nonetheless, a closer look brings us to an ascertainment that it is, at least to some yet significant extent, culturally diversified. For this reason, which is mostly attributable to historical experiences and peculiar paths,

the relations between religiosity, secularity and postsecularity form into non-identical settings in different European societies. These contextures, together with specific ideological constellations and distinct degrees of inner cultural heterogeneity, provide a challenge for multifaceted analyses.

Besides the attempt to feature the diverseness among possible outcomes of applying the category of "the postsecular" to different European societies, there are also still problematic issues related to this category at theoretical level. This paper aims to show that the most credible results would come from interfacing theoretical, abstract level of reflexion with a considerable dose of particularistic approach.

## The Postsecular: Postsecularism or Postsecularity?

Anappellation "the postsecular" avoids the above differentiation. The noun deriving from the adjective, or as Habermas calls it - the predicate, is used for describing a new model of society<sup>1</sup>. Debates with use of this category have flourished after Jürgen Habermas' speech *Faith and Knowledge* delivered in October 2001, shortly after the fundamentalist terrorists' attack on September 11th<sup>2</sup>. Although even Habermas finds the idea of postsecular society controversial<sup>3</sup>, it can be seriously considered whether we can speak about a new paradigm in conceiving late modern, complex and heterogeneous societies. Philip Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, editors of the book *The Postsecular in Question*, speak about an "important shift in scholarly thinking about religion and secularism"<sup>4</sup>, which might be considered as postsecularisation of the science itself.

To make a step further in order to get more precise tools of analysis, it seems to be useful to make some necessary differentiations between the notions of postsecularism and postsecularity. One of the possible and hopefully plausible ways to establish relations between them is to refer postsecularism and postsecularity respectively to notions of secularism and secularity. Further analogy can be found in the pairs of multiculturalism and multiculturality, or even postmodernism and postmodernity; albeit the rule happens not to be the case in reference to the pair of modernism and

---

\* Uniwersytet Szczeciński, mail: anna\_krolikowska@wp.pl

<sup>1</sup> J. Habermas, *Notes on Post-Secular Society*, "New Perspectives Quarterly", 2008, vol. 25 (4), p. 27; Compare J. D. Boy, *What we talk about when we talk about the postsecular*, The Immanent Frame. Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere, 2011, retrieved from: <https://tif.ssrc.org/2011/03/15/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-the-postsecular/>

<sup>2</sup> K. Snelson, *Habermas on Faith, Knowledge and 9-11*, Nettime mailinglist archives, Nov.17<sup>th</sup> 2001, retrieved from: <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0111/msg00100.html>

<sup>3</sup> J. Habermas, *Notes on Post-Secular Society*, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society*, P. Gorski, D. Kyuman Kim, J. Torpey, J. Van Antwerpen, (eds.), New York, London 2012, p. 1.

modernity<sup>5</sup>. Within each of these dyads, the former category refers not only to a set of values and ideas, but also to principled position and consequent directives, or sometimes to a programme to be realised or a policy to be implemented, while the latter concerns real, factual state of affairs. For instance, secularism is defined as a doctrine and ideological programme for disseminating nonreligious or atheistic world-view<sup>6</sup>. Since the secularistic project can be implemented within social institutions, i.e. with use among other things certain legal means, secularism can be situated somewhere between ideal dimension and authority, that is to say, between culture and power. The archetypical illustration of large contribution of a power component is rigid disestablishment between religion and public sphere in French Laïcité. On the other hand, secularity denotes being secular, without formulating a reason of how it has come to that state. As Phil Zuckerman, Luke Galen and Frank Pasquale simply put it, secularism is all about “the way things should be”, whereas secularity – “the way things are”<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, while multiculturalism denotes “a position”<sup>8</sup>, suffixes -ity enables to describe actual situation of a society which is multicultural, irrespectively of virtual relationships prevailing between cultural groups within given society<sup>9</sup>.

The postsecular, though being itself a vast theme, can also be seen as located in wider contexts. Postsecularism as an ideological stance might be found in subordinated position to multiculturalism, or it could be looked into as phenomenon to be explained against the postmodernistic background. Besides the attempts to frame postsecularism into any broader paradigm, a “natural” reference point or backcloth to the postsecular is the secular. Coming to more detailed analyses, which relate the phenomenon under discussion with different spheres or levels of social life, it may be sensible to make use of Zukerman, Galen and Pasquale’s distinguishing between types of secularism<sup>10</sup>. The authors discern political, public, and cultural secularism. When it comes to an individual level, they argue, one ought to speak about personal secularity rather and not of personal secularism<sup>11</sup>. If this path is followed and the above distinctions are transposed onto the ground of “the post-“ categories, it would enable to identify various aspects of postsecularism in its varied applications. Thus, political

<sup>5</sup> This is because ‘Modernism’ stands firstly for the movement in arts, or, secondly, for a current in Catholic theology.

<sup>6</sup> J. Mariański, *Sekularyzacja*, in: *Religia. Encyklopedia PWN*, T. Gadacz, B. Milerski (eds.), vol. 9, Warszawa 2003, p. 63-66; compare J. Habermas, Cited above, 27.

<sup>7</sup> P. Zuckerman, L. Galen, F. Pasquale, *The Nonreligious. Understanding Secular People and Societies*, New York 2016, p. 23.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. B. Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism*, Cambridge, MA 2002, pp. 403.

<sup>9</sup> Even when multiculturalism is described as “taking up the problems which different cultures have living together within one society” (W. Welsch, *Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today*, in: *Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World*, M. Featherstone, S. Lash (eds.), London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 1999, p. 196), such interpretation does not expressly indicate how these problems should be solved.

<sup>10</sup> P. Zuckerman, L. Galen, F. Pasquale, *The Nonreligious*, op. cit., sp. 23.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 23-24.

postsecularism would be understood as ideologically inspired rules and recommendations pertaining to degrees and forms of bringing religious elements into the sphere of politics and legislation. Public postsecularism would relate to cognitive legitimisation together with axionormatively justified guidelines expected to reshape public domain in rather new – in the cases of previously secular cultural landscape – situation of being permeated with visible and hearable religious actors. Remoulding Zukerman, Galen and Pasquale's definition of cultural secularism ("ideological position or principle that argues for the absence or elimination of religious beliefs and behaviours among all members and institutions within a society")<sup>12</sup> into cultural postsecularism, one could obtain perhaps such a definition of cultural postsecularism: it is an ideological position or principle which argues, that presence of religious beliefs and behaviours should be accepted in the society and that it has a potential of positive contribution to the society. While differentiating between dimensions of postsecularism, we should not forget of an individual level. Bearing in mind socio-cultural, i.e. intersubjective character of ideology, we should notice, nevertheless, that individual attitudes to the system of ideological claims are of key importance. The more individual consciousnesses are compatible with given set of ideas, the bigger are chances for the macro scale success in implementation of ideological programme and its principles. Moreover, proponents of the world-view become disseminators actively contributing to social norms construction, even when they have no influential institutional embedment. The question, if we should speak rather of postsecularity or of postdecalasism at the personal level, touches a question about bottom-upwards or top-downwards ways of constructing social reality. Not pretending to settle here this issue from theoretical point of view, we may agree that in each case it should be also figured out at empirical level. To say again, when we ask about postsecularity, we are interested in actual state of social repositions indicating acceptance for, or display of, the postsecular.

### **Does the Postsecular Supersede the Secular?**

Do we live in a postsecular age then? Such a question, which sounds somewhat naive, requires a complex answer, encompassing levels both of theoretical generalisations and that of idiographic character. To some extent this is a question about fortunes of secularisation and successes of its theories. Theoretical and data-based interpretations which are to be accounted for the manifestation of the strength of secularistic paradigm, seem to hold firmly. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel put forward a revised version of modernisation theory, with foci on linkages between

---

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 23.

socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional dimensions<sup>13</sup>. Building upon a huge number of data from World Value Survey, the authors maintain that the shift to secular-rational values is associated with modernisation and industrialisation, and along with post-modernisation and development of post-industrial societies, self-expressional values become appreciated. In their interpretations, however, the self-expressional values have nothing to do, and to say more, are contradictory to anything that is religious in conventional connotations of the word. According to authors, the line of changes presented by them is concomitantly a line of human development. Whereas religiosity persists in poorer, vulnerable populations, which are still threatened by risks<sup>14</sup>, changes in attitudes towards family, gender, authority, politics, religion, and life in general tend toward the arrangement providing favourable conditions for development of civic virtues, democratic values and institutions. This course of argumentation brings Inglehart and Welzel to formulate “an emancipative theory of democracy”<sup>15</sup>.

As proclaiming economic determinism and unilinear vision of modernisation, as well as defining cultural development strictly in occidental terms, Ronald Inglehart and his co-authors consistently underpin the paradigm of secularisation. While the immensity of work and effort is undeniable and impressive, the interpretative layer may seem controversial. The evolutionistic, teleological approach represented by these researchers may meet with polemics coming from their relativist opponents. One of the possible responses could read as the title of a Richard Schweder’s essay: “Moral Maps, »First World« Conceits, and the New Evangelists”<sup>16</sup>. Inglehart’s theory can be also criticised from the position of multiple modernity theorists and categorised by them to the class of theories “assuming that there is a single modernity, that is, the Western one, which occupies the highest level of evolution of human society, and to which the rest of the world should converge”<sup>17</sup>.

Jürgen Habermas does not take utterly clear position towards the casual relationships which Inglehart is so much convinced of. On the one hand, the German philosopher calls the “close linkage between the modernization of society and the secularization of the population” merely a hypothesis<sup>18</sup>, but on the other hand, he acknowledges that “religious communities owe their persisting influence to an obstinate survival of pre-Modern modes of thought”<sup>19</sup>.

The earlier mentioned distinction between secularism and secularity is not always discrete, and perhaps this is the case in Europe, since the French Enlightenment ideas

---

<sup>13</sup> R. Inglehart, C. Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, Democracy, Human Development Sequence*, New York 2005, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> P. Norris, R. Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge 2004, pp. 343.

<sup>15</sup> R. Inglehart, C. Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, Democracy*, op. cit., p. 299.

<sup>16</sup> R. A. Schweder, *Moral Maps, “First World” Conceits, and the New Evangelists*, in: *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, L. E. Harrison, S. P. Huntington (eds.), New York 2000, p. 158.

<sup>17</sup> A. Ichijo, *Nationalism and Multiple Modernities. Europe and Beyond*, Basingstoke 2013, p. 11.

<sup>18</sup> J. Habermas, *Notes on Post-Secular Society*, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 27.

have been deeply embedded in the continental European mainstream culture. As José Casanova puts it, being secular is an important component in the package of traits that Europeans are proud of: “the natural response of Europeans to the question of whether they are »religious« would seem to be »Of course, I am not religious«”<sup>20</sup>. The reasons for difference in attitudes towards religion between Europe and America lie in different history and intellectual traditions. In European understanding being religious is contrary to being modern. Moreover, as Casanova depicts it, in Western Europe religious people are perceived as “unfree, heteronomous, nonrational”<sup>21</sup>. In America the things are different: religiousness does not indicate any contradiction to being a modern, free agent.

With these in mind, our guesstimates as to the postsecularity in Europe should be much more moderate. Jürgen Habermas by no means claims that secularised members of the affluent, Western-world societies experience some sort of religious revival. Not only decades, but even centuries of secularisation processes cannot be (at least in any common way) reverted. Nevertheless, speaking on contemporary situation of European societies, one cannot avoid taking into account growing multiculturalism of many of them caused by immigration from outside Europe. That is what Habermas does, stating that in current situation secularised participants of liberal civil society are pressured to recognise voices of those who refer to traditional religious values, norms, and narratives. Facing in their own backyards evidences of the irrefragable anymore “resurgence of religion”<sup>22</sup> in the world outside, secular contributors of the inclusive civil society should abandon their previous expectations that all citizens would soon get to the stage where they partake in public debate without any references to the sacred. In these terms, postsecularism may look like reactive, or adaptive project developed with conjunct forces of intellectuals and policy-makers, who have had no other choice but to rewrite their previous ideological positions in the new position<sup>23</sup> and to proclaim that religious groups and religiously motivated voices can contribute to the weal of the society.

The postsecular society may be grasped empirically somewhere between the sole ascertainment of undeniable presence of religion(s) in social sphere, and widespread acceptance for this state of affairs. The postsecular position can be presented both by religious and non-religious individuals or groups. Postsecularly religious attitude entails certain degree of being secularised. In Habermasian model, religions – in order to play acceptable roles in the public sphere – must fulfil several prerequisites: rework their attitudes to the presence of other religions within the society, give due recognition to authority of science, and “participate in the premises of a constitutional state, which

---

<sup>20</sup> J. Casanova, *The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms*, in: *Rethinking secularism*, C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer, J. Van Antwerpen (eds.), New York 2011, p. 68.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 68.

<sup>22</sup> J. Habermas, *Notes on Post-Secular Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> K. Snelson, *Habermas on Faith*, *op. cit.*

is based on a non-sacred concept of morality"<sup>24</sup>. Otherwise, vis-à-vis modernising society, religion may "develop a destructive potential"<sup>25</sup>. Also stronger degree of secularisation may enable effective communication: "A secularization that does not annihilate is brought about as a kind of translation"<sup>26</sup>. But secularist mind set is an impediment. Habermas doubts "whether a secularist devaluation of religion (...) is at all compatible with that postsecular balance between shared citizenship and cultural difference"<sup>27</sup>. Mutual recognition needs a dose of willingness and is a "complementary learning processes"<sup>28</sup> engaging ideological parties from the both sides: that representing religious traditionalism as well as that of secularism<sup>29</sup>. They are expected to mitigate their languages and meet each other somewhere in half of the road.

## Socio-culturally Differentiated Map of Europe

There are no doubts that we can speak about European culture. This is due to common foundation: the heritage of Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, and Middle Ages' Christendom. Europeans refer to the same sets of symbols, know the same myths and great narratives. They treasure reason and share many ideas, the concept of law and citizenship. But on the other hand, differences in historical experience have diversified cultures of European societies. Among other characteristics, religiosity, patterns of thinking about religious matters, role attached to religion and position of Church have been shaped by historical processes and as such should be described and explained also in particular societies' background contexts. Obviously, also many other, greater or smaller similarities between particular societies can be pointed out, as resulting from experiences shared later than the mentioned above, especially when we consider various planes of factors and their implications. Among the group of factors pertaining to some European countries - while other of them have no that kind of heritage - are such as, for example, decades of experience of the Communist regime in XX century, or guilt trip referred to the colonialist past and other faults<sup>30</sup>. The past events have shaped body of particular social identity, values and norms, including degree of intensity and contents of national identity. The other features are distinctive traditions of democracy vs autocracy, or their vicissitudes throughout time. The mentioned traits seem to influence contemporary balance between appraisalment of the

---

<sup>24</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>25</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>27</sup> J. Habermas, *Notes on Post-Secular Society*, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem, p. 27.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, p. 28; K. Snelson, *Habermas on Faith*, op. cit.

<sup>30</sup> Confer P. Bruckner, *The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, Princeton, NJ2010, pp. 239.

past and setting goals in the future, visions of the future, or peculiar connotation associated to nationalism.

Taking into account path dependence mechanisms, it should be noted that sometimes differentiation between historical factors and their cultural outcomes is of analytic character. For example, the split into Western and the Eastern Christianity was not only a factor, but also a consequence of deep cultural differentials between Greek and Latin tradition inheritors, concerning relations between state and Church authorities, etiquettes, alphabet, art, readiness for changes, and others. Similarly, strong position of the Catholic Church in Poland in XIX-XX centuries was a corollary of different but mostly oppressive political situations, but it also moulded other aspects of social life, including the form (of expression, celebrating etc.) and content of Polish national identity. Hence, for many historical reasons, one common characteristic, like Catholicism, do not mean the same in reference to European societies, if only to compare the historical path of France – with more than two centuries of tradition of strong and active secularism, Spain – with the colonial and proselytistic past and XX century's baggage of Civil War and Franco's reign, or so much different fortunes of Catholicism in Czech and in Ireland.

Norman Davies<sup>31</sup> draws several axes of division which occurred in different moments of European history and which considerably influenced the sphere of culture. These are: a division made by limes of the Roman Empire (which introduced a firm enough division into the civilised and the barbarians), a split into the Western and the Eastern Christianity, the next one made by Reformation, and then a rupture of the Iron Curtain. The other meaningful differentiation was of economic character, consisting in different time and intensity of modernisation<sup>32</sup>. Davies presents these listed here fault lines as those which can be treated as dividing into the Western and Eastern Europe, or into more European and less European parts of the continent<sup>33</sup>. Consequently, the most European and the most Western would be members of the societies that experienced Pax Romana and then Pax Christiana built by the Roman Church, became Protestant, early modernised, and not experienced the Communist regime<sup>34</sup>. The next and one of the most prominent quality in today reality is a membership, or non-membership, as well as the very seniority in the European Union.

---

<sup>31</sup> N. Davies, *Europe: A History*, Oxford 1996, p. 18.

<sup>32</sup> The historian encloses also a diagram of cultural circles within Europe, listing values typical for each of them. So there are: the Roman/Carolignan/Gallic circle, Scandinavian/Celtic/Anglo-Saxon circle, Iberian one, Greco-Byzantine/Orthodox circle and Transatlantic one. Many specific cultural phenomena appeared on circles' crossings, spawning cultural multifariousness; N. Davies, *Europe: A History*, op. cit., p. 1238.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 18-29.

<sup>34</sup> As an interesting example can serve Polish translation of widely used sociology course book by Anthony Giddens. Students can find out there, that the Western European states are labelled as Europe without adjectives, which is not in the case of the Eastern European countries, presented there with adjective, as "Eastern Europe". A. Giddens, *Socjologia*, Warszawa 2006, p. 59. (English original of that version was published in 2001, fourth edition).



Europe presents itself as quite manifestly differentiated when seen through quantitative measures, too. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel's cultural maps based on longitudinal cross-national World Values Survey, depict Sweden as the most secular-rational society with the highest scores of self-expression values, Romania as very close to the survival values pole and quite traditional, and Poland, Portugal and Ireland relatively close to the pole of traditional values<sup>35</sup>.

## Who is Postsecular in Europe then?

Postsecularity can be searched for at different levels: that of individuals, groups, milieus, institutions, societies, or in any wider scale that is justified by the influence of certain cultural vibe. The overarching mind-set in the postsecular society should be equipped with reflexivity, ability to distance oneself to one's own position, openness to dialogue and co-operation, acceptance of other worldviews and their manifestations. Religious people should attain the ability to translate their own religious position to the language which is more understandable and have more chances to convince for their non-religious co-citizens<sup>36</sup>. This may serve as an argument about the importance of individual attitudes, and then skills to participate in the public realm. As Jürgen Habermas sees it, all society members, regardless of their position on the religious – secular continuum, (should) accept these rules because they invoke the good of the heterogeneous society as their motive. Habermas builds such a bit idyllic vision as a solution to his concern about functioning of late modern liberal, more and more axiologically diversified society. But, taking it empirically, mind-sets presented by him as indispensable element of this kind of society are not as common as he would like them to be, though one might believe this effect is going to be achieved by further ideological impact of postsecularism.

---

<sup>35</sup> *Live Cultural Map 1981-2015*, World Value Survey, 2015, retrieved from: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings>. If someone would draw too far-reaching conclusions from Inglehart and Welzel's cultural maps, he or she should conceive Poland as staying in much smaller cultural distance to South Asian, South American, and even Islamic countries than to European Protestant societies, which would be an evident simplification, if not an absurd; compare C. Sterbenz, *This Chart Explains Every Culture in the World*, "Business Insider", July 3<sup>rd</sup>2014, retrieved from: <http://www.businessinsider.com/inglehart-welzel-culture-map-2014-7?IR=T>. Some other evidences for weaknesses and limitations of the quantitative and comparative approach can be found, for example, in Pippa Norris and Roland Inglehart's juxtapositions of analysed countries, where Spain, the country ruled in authoritarian way till 1975 is called "older democracy", while Poland, on the grounds of being under the Communist regime is categorised as "younger democracy", disregarding its old democratic tradition. The other simplifying example of aggregative attempt can be the taken for granted ascertainment, that human rights and civil liberties existed in the Western European democracies for longer part of twentieth century (disregarding, e.g., the fact that voting rights for women in Switzerland were introduced in 1971); P. Norris, R. Inglehart, cited above, p. 247-251, 131.

<sup>36</sup> K. Snelson, *Habermas on Faith*, op. cit.

As it is said, postsecular attitude needs some degree of secular attitude, but not secularistic one. This may be rede as the prerequisite demanding to discard not only premodern, but also modern consciousness, as it might be evidenced by the fight against "Enlightenment fundamentalists"<sup>37</sup>. However, today European societies are in fact mosaics comprised of modern, late-modern (or postmodern), but also in some instances of premodern world outlooks. This diversity can be described at the level of individual societies. The other dimension of diversification is that from one society to another. Europe is quite innerly differentiated as far as the level of religiosity (which is proved, e.g.by European Values Study), the advancement of secularisation processes, and motives of these situations are concerned. This, only to some extent consequently, means that secular, postsecular, or even presecular mentalities are represented there. It should be added again, that equating the modern with the secular may be somewhat misleading, as it suffices to note Charles Taylor concept of neo-Durkheimian usage of religion and religiosity for social integration and mobilisation in times when religious order is being undermined<sup>38</sup>. In several European societies a greater or lesser dose of mobilisation, which, perhaps, should be seen in a broader, cultural frame as a reaction to cultural and socio-structural change within Europe, is observed. The mass immigration of Muslim religion representatives is not the only context. There are considerable evidences that in the Eastern European, Orthodox countries, mostly those previously dominated by the Soviet Union, as well in very Russia, religion reasserts its status of a national identity component<sup>39</sup>. In Poland, an example of manifestation of such a reactive, one might say – neo-Durkheimian mobilisation was the venture called "Rosary to the borders" in the year 2017. This, as well as many other displays of collective religiosity performing more than purely religious functions, are not in themselves of postsecular character. Even though Polish so-called national religion<sup>40</sup> has visibly narrowed down since the end of the Communist era, it has not been terminated. Instead, it still keep some potential which in certain circumstances emerge from the latent state. A belief that clinging to religion and its defence are indispensable obligations is of course not necessarily rooted in national or any other extra-religious identity. Tomasz Rowiński, one of representatives of religious-not-secularised position (what by the same token means a religious-not-postsecular position), attempts to disclosure postsecularism as too oppressive, bowdlerising, ideologically- and politically-driven project, which, as such, is unacceptable for

---

<sup>37</sup> J. Habermas, *Notes on Post-Secular Society*, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>38</sup> C. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, Cambridge, Mass. 2007, pp. 447-500.

<sup>39</sup> M. Lipka, N. Sahgal, *9 key findings about religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, Pew Research Center, May 10<sup>th</sup> 2017, retrieved from: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/10/9-key-findings-about-religion-and-politics-in-central-and-eastern-europe/>.

<sup>40</sup> Keeping in mind José Casanova's interpretation of Polish public religiosity, the presence of civil religion component might be further examined; J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago 1994, p. 92-113.

authentic Christian believers<sup>41</sup>. One of the possible findings emerging from this, perforce much incomplete picture is that in contemporary European landscape antipostsecularistic standpoints are presented not only by presecular newcomers, but they may be a display of an indigenous identity, too. In both cases, motives are findable not only on the religious plane. That is what Jürgen Habermas omits in his considerations, as his model of the postsecular civil society disregards distinction between the religion historically bound with the place and a religion that has found itself in that place as a result of migration.

Trying to answer then in short to the question posed in the heading of this unit, one should admit, that postsecularism as a set of ideas, claims and directives is more accepted in the societies which already have been closer to the Habermasian liberal state model. When it comes to multiculturally-oriented postsecularism, it seems that it is more accepted in societies inclinable, for different historical reasons, to break with their ideological traditions from the past and focused on building new inclusively defined identity. But still, this is not a very regular pattern, to mention France – as proud of its republican and thereby secularistic tradition.

It might be assumed, that intersection of (the older) secularistic position and concomitantly (the newer) multiculturalistic stance brings about a specific twofold attitude which consists in simultaneous acquiescence to more exotic religions and strong criticism to home-grown religion historically bound with their society and displayed by autochthonic Europeans. The other assumption, or rather observation, is that multiculturalist and in this sense postsecularist ideas are more gladly accepted by elites and aspiring strata of the middle class than by the lower social strata representants, whose expectations of any kind of rewards that would emerge from adopting new attitudes are much lower.

This short and deficient overview do not allow to formulate any firm conclusions. What can be stated instead, is that religious landscape of Europe is very intricate and interweaved into many other aspects of social life. Categories of the postsecular, in concert with the more classic categories of description, contribute much to explaining this multifaceted phenomena and dependencies.

---

<sup>41</sup> T. Rowiński, *Czy człowiek może przeżyć nowożytność? Uwagi o apologiach postsekularyzmu*, „Frona. Pismo Poświęcone”, 2012, vol. 4 (65), retrieved from: <http://www.pismofrona.pl/tomasz-rowinski-czy-czlowiek-moze-przezyc-nowozytnosc-uwagi-o-apologiach-postsekularyzmu>.